Indigent Children And Fiscal Clearing by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 28 | Issue 2 Article 9
Fall 9-1-1971
Indigent Children And Fiscal Clearing
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Indigent Children And Fiscal Clearing, 28 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 423 (1971),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol28/iss2/9
NOTES
marketability, and once this is realized there will in all likelihood be less
reluctance to take advantage of the incentive.
It appears that from a legal standpoint communities can require, by
one method or another, that part of future developments be built to ease
the need for low and moderate income housing. In addition to these legal
questions, the exclusionary tendency of the suburbs is a significant barrier
to implementation of these methods. 02 The more difficult question is not
whether communities can provide the housing, but whether they will do
so. These methods, whatever their ultimate form, will only be
implemented when municipalities are ready for them. 0 3 A determination
of when this will be is better left to sociologists, but the urgency of the
problem makes one hope that a willingness will soon arrive.
JOHN J.E. MARKHAM II
INDIGENT CHILDREN AND FISCAL CLEARING
It is the policy of the law to protect the interests of minor children
incapable of looking after their own affairs.' Where any indigent child,
2
who is cared for at state expense, has legally responsible relatives or
friends in another state willing to provide a home for the child even though
they are financially unable to support him, it will be in the child's best
interests that he be placed with them.3 However, the administrative
procedures and policies of state welfare departments often retard or
'ln the REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968)
it was recognized that even a national fair housing law would "not deal with an equally
impenetrable barrier, the unavailability of low and moderate income housing in non-ghetto
areas." Id. at 263 (emphasis added).
'"Exclusionary sentiment in the suburbs has been labeled municipal parochialism by
the courts. See, e.g., Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560,42 N.E.2d 516 (1942). See
also Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMtS 317 (1955); Comment, Zoning Against the Public Welfare: Judicial Limitations
on Municipal Parochialism, 71 YALE L.J. 720 (1962).
'See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Carlon's Estate, 43 Cal. App. 2d 204, 110 P.2d 488
(1941); In re Anderson's Estate, 20 I11. App. 2d 305, 155 N.E.2d 839 (1959); Zoski v. Gaines,
271 Mich. 1, 260 N.W. 99 (1935); Fiorella v. Fiorella, 241 Mo. App. 180, 240 S.W.2d 147
(1951); Pieri v. Nebbia, 178 Misc. 388, 34 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1942); Tart v. Register, 257 N.C.
161, 125 S.E.2d 754 (1962). This policy is based on the theory that the state, as parens
patriae should protect the child against those who might take advantage of him.
2The term "indigent" is commonly used to refer to one's financial ability, and
ordinarily indicates one who is without means of comfortable subsistence. Weeks v.
Mansfield, 84 Conn. 544, 80 A. 784 (1911). See also note 49 infra.
'If the child's interest will be better promoted by awarding the custody to a non-resident
the court will not hesitate to do so because of the residence of the applicant. See note I supra.
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prohibit such transfers through the use of fiscal clearing- when the
financial burden of supporting the indigent child threatens to shift to the
receiving state. 5 Realizing that the financial burden of supporting the child
would now fall upon them, some receiving states, before admitting the
indigent child, require the custodial state to agree to retain financial
responsibility.'
Fiscal clearing has its historical source in the English law of public
assistance which was known as the Elizabethan Act of 1601 For the Relief
of the Poor. 7 This Act established the principle of local responsibility for
indigents as taxation was imposed upon the parishes for the public
support of local indigent adults and children.8 Under this public assistance
policy special attention was given to the vocational training of indigent
children. The imposition of local responsibility resulted, however, in
attempts to reduce this relief burden.9
In 1662 a statute was passed placing "strangers" in a class unentitled
to relief."0 In their efforts to combat vagrancy and mendicancy the English
localities developed rules regarding the settlement and removal of
4"Fiscal clearing" is the term specifically applied by Judge Justine Polier of the New
York Family Court to the financial processing involved in the transfer of indigent children.
See In re Paul and Mark, 64 Misc. 2d 382, 315 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1970).
'The term "receiving state" refers to that state to which the indigent child is being sent
and the term "custodial state" denotes the state in whose custody the child remains pending
fiscal clearing.
'Many states require not only that the consent of the state welfare board be obtained
before any dependent child be brought into the state, but a bond must be furnished to insure
that the child will not become a public charge. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 52-509 to -510
(1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 36 (1965). Other states avoid the indemnity bond
arrangement by merely requiring the custodial state to sign a guarantee to retain welfare
responsibility. See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 16.414(d) (Repl. Vol. 1968). Fiscal clearing will be
the term used throughout to refer to such guaranty and indemnity procedures.
743 Elizabeth ch. 2 (1601).
'See Reisenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law, 43 CAL. L.
REV. 175, 178 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Reisenfeld).
91d. at 181.
'Such an effort came with a 1662 statute:
That it shall and may be lawful, upon complaint made by the
churchwardens or overseers of the poor of any parish, to any justice of
peace, within forty days after any such person or persons coming so to
settle as aforesaid, in any tenement under the yearly value of ten pounds,
for any two justices of the peace, whereof one to be . . .of the division
where any person or persons that are likely to be chargeable to the parish
shall come to inhabit, by their warrant to remove and convey such person
or persons to such parish where he or they were last legally settled ...
Act of 1662, 13 & 14, Car. II c. 12, as quoted in Reisenfeld at 181-82. This statute provided
for the forced removal of "strangers" who were really unwanted indigents. See also
Mandelker, Exclusion and Removal Legislation, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 57, 58; Note,
Depression Migrants and the States, 53 HARV. L. REv. 1031, 1032 (1940).
potential paupers. Local jurisdictions passed laws which called for the
forced removal of paupers from the locality if they had not lived in the
parish for the time required by statute." Colonists transplanted similar
laws to America during the seventeenth century. 2
Due to the increase in population and economic development of the
colonies during the American eighteenth century, new methods were
devised to accommodate welfare recipients. 13 The erection of local
almshouses for children, the tightening of settlement laws, and the further
development of provisions for the removal of unsettled paupers- are
examples." States enacted exclusion and removal statutes based on the
English statutory and judicial practice and these did receive some court
support." In New York v. Miln, 6 the Supreme Court dealt- with a New
York statute which imposed upon the master of a vessel the obligation to
report to the authorities the last legal settlement, age and occupation of
every passenger brought into the port of New York from another state or
country. The Court upheld the statute as
competent and as necessary for a State to provide precautionary
measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds,'and
possibly convicts, as it is to guard against the physical pestilence
which may arise from unsound and infectious articles
imported . . .17
"Reisenfeld at 192-200.
"2The colonies authorized the public support of indigent children; provided for their
education; farmed out to foster homes the children of indigent parents; held that the home
residence of the child was liable for all support expenses given the child by another residence;




"sThe statute of 1662 also provided for the compulsory removal to his place of residence
of any person "likely to become chargeable." Thus evolved the practice of removal. This
statute allows relief administrators to transport to their place of settlement persons who were
ineligible for relief as well as prohibited persons thought to be potential relief recipients from
acquiring a settlement. Mandelker, Exclusion and Removal Legislation, 1956 Wis. L. REv.
57, 58. In regards to exclusion laws, the state imposed civil and criminal liability upon
anyone who brought a poor person into a locality with knowledge or intent that the
individual will become a public charge. Id. For a discussion of the constitutionality of
exclusion legislation, see text accompanying notes 33-38 infra.
"New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (II Pet.) 357 (1837). A few convictions under laws against
bringing indigents into a state have been upheld by state courts. See State v. Cornish, 66
N.H. 329, 21 A. 180 (1890); Winfield v. Mapes, 4 Denio 571 (N.Y. 1847). There was
Supreme Court dicta that the state could defend against indigents which were brought in and
likely to become public charges. See Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 140, 155 (Wayne, J.,
concurring), 190-91 (Grier, J. concurring), 193-94 (Taney, J. dissenting) (1848); Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)417, 440 (1842).
1136 U.S. at 369.
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By 1940, local responsibility for the poor, indigent exclusion procedures
and settlement were being determined by statute.'
To these restrictions upon freedom of movement some states added
more legislation which concerned the interstate travel of children,
especially the indigent.:9 The Uniform Transfer of Dependents Act was
approved in 1935 by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association.2n The Act has
been adopted by eleven states2' and authorizes the state welfare agency to
enter into reciprocal agreements with the custodial state relating to the
acceptance, transfer, and support of the indigent child. It is also provided
that no state shall be committed to the support of persons who were
ineligible in the opinion of the receiving state.
2
The idea of reciprocal agreements23 has not been ignored by other
states. New York is one of six states that has enacted a statute providing
for interstate compacts on the placement of children.2 4 The statute
provides that the custodial agency retains financial responsibility for the
child unless the receiving state agrees to provide welfare assistance for the
indigent child. Based on the statutory provisions, New York can avoid
having to support the child.2 In addition to these compacts some states
18See Note, Depression Migrants and the States, 53 HARV. L. REv. 1031, 1033 (1940).
As of 1940, thirty-eight states required a resident to live in the jurisdiction one year before he
was eligible for public assistance; twenty-eight states provided that settlement could be lost
by non-residence during a period equal to or shorter than that required to gain one.
Regarding the development of exclusion statutes, by 1940 twenty-seven states made it a
misdemeanor to bring an indigent into the state or imposed a fine for so doing. Some states
even provided that non-settled indigents could be forcibly removed. Id. at 1033-34.
"I1n re Higgins, 46 Misc. 233, 259 N.Y.S.2d 874, 878 (Family Ct. 1965).
2*UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 9C at 216 (1935).
21The 11 states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana, Maine,
Minnesota, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Virginia. CAL. WELF. &
INST'NS CODE §§ 18400-18401 (West Ann. 1966); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 119-5-1 to -
5-4 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-293 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 119 (1953);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:01-02 (1950); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 4191 (1964); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 261.25, 261.251 (1959); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-06-11 to -06-12 (1960); PA.
STAT. tit. 62 § 209 (1968); S.D. CODE § 28-16-7 (1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-99 (Repl.
Vol. 1968).
2d.
2The prefatory note to this Act gives a reading of the purpose or idea behind the Act:
In recent years there has been a great change of sentiment. . . upon which
the transfer of public dependents by the states should be effected, and
experience has demonstrated the wisdom of having legislation passed
which will enable each state to confer upon its public welfare officials the
right to enter into reciprocal agreements for the interchange of dependents,
rather than in attempting to have uniform settlement laws.
UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 9C at 218-19.
1AN.Y. SOCIAL SERvIcEs LAW 374a (McKinney 1966).
2The other 5 states that have complementary legislation are Kentucky, Maine, New
NOTES
have enacted separate statutes which affect the mobility of children in
need of placement. For example, Michigan states that it is a misdemeanor
for a county agent to bring about the transportation of an indigent child
into Michigan without the welfare district's official approval.2 6 Arkansas
has provided that the Arkansas State Department shall administer all
child welfare activities including the regulation and importation of
indigent children.2 1 If these statutes, compacts, and uniform acts are
considered along with the state statutes requiring indemnification as to the
child's public liability,28 a wide network of restrictions upon the child's
placement in a receiving state is apparent.
In 1941, the United States Supreme Court in Edwards v. California
9
held unconstitutional a California exclusion statute3 which made it a
crime to knowingly bring a poor person into the state. This decision,
which forced the first breach in the statutes based on the English Poor
Laws,2' employed the commerce clause as a vehicle to consider the state's
interference with interstate commerce. 2 The Court determined that the
exclusion statute burdened the indigent citizen*'s constitutional right of
interstate travel which was found not to admit of diverse treatment merely
because paupers were involved.3
In 1969, the Court in Shapiro v. Thompsonl extended its holding in
Edwards and held that residency requirements for state welfare recipients
were unconstitutional. Shapiro involved statutory provisions3 which
denied welfare assistance to residents of the state who had not been present
within the jurisdiction for at least one year immediately preceding their
Hampshire, North Dakota, and Wyoming. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.341 (1969); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 4191-4200 (1964); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 170-A:I to -A:6
(Supp. 1970); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-13-01 to -13-08 (Supp. 1969); Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-52.1
to -52.9 (1957).
21MCH. STAT. ANN. § 16.450 (1) (Rev. Vol. 1968).
27ARK. STAT. ANN. § 83-109 (Repl. Vol. 1960).
23See note 6 supra.
-314 U.S. 160 (1941).
3See notes 15 and 18 supra.
3'Mandelker, Exclusion and Removal Legislation, 1956 Wis. L. REV. 57.
22314 U.S. 174, 176. The Court referred to Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm
Products, which explained the commerce clause.
This court has repeatedly declared that the grant [commerce clause]
established the immunity of interstate commerce from the control of the
States respecting all those suljects embraced within the grant which are of
such a nature as to demand that, if regulated at all, their regulation must
be prescribed by a single authority.
306 U.S. 346, 351 (1939).
"314 U.S. at 175-77. Paupers were held to be entitled to the same rights as any other
United States citizen.
-394 U.S. 618 (1969).
3-Connecticut and Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia statutes were involved.
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application for such assistance. The Court held that, absent a compelling
state interest, the statutory provisions violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment since the classification of residency touched
upon the fundamental constitutional right of interstate travel., The Court
concluded that the statutory purpose of inhibiting the migration by needy
people into the state is constitutionally impermissible.
Though the Court has yet to rule on whether the receiving state can
require the sending state to retain financial responsibility, Edwards and
Shapiro have served as a basis upon which the Family Court of New
York, in two cases, extended the law by ruling fiscal clearing practices to
be unconstitutional.37 In the first of these cases, In re Higgins, a family
court judge was presented with a demand by Michigan authorities that
New York sign a guarantee 9 promising the three year old child would not
become a public charge in Michigan. Michigan deemed this necessary in
order to validate a private arrangement that had been made for the child
to live with his maternal aunt in Michigan. 0 The mother, who was living
in New York, died while the father was in prison. The New York court
decided it did not have the power to comply with this requirement and that
the demand for such an agreement deprived the child of her constitutional
right to freedom of travel. The court analogized the Michigan fiscal
clearing demand to the exclusion statute in Edwards v. California. The
analogy appears correct in that both statutes were discriminatory by
creating two classes of citizens. In Edwards, California recognized that
local indigents were entitled to welfare and freedom of travel and
51394 U.S. at 638. According to the Court if a migrant had to operate under such a
statute he would be greatly inhibited in his interstate freedom of travel.
An indigent who desires to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a new
life will doubtless hesitate if he knows that he must risk making the move
Without the possibility of falling back on state welfare assistance during his
first year of residence, when his need may be most acute.
Id. at 629.
'In re Paul and Mark, 64 Misc. 2d 466, 315 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Family Ct. 1970); In re
Higgins, 46 Misc. 2d 233, 259 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Family Ct. 1965).
'146 Misc. 2d 233, 259 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Family Ct. 1965).
3 See MICH. STATS. ANN. § 16.414(d) (Repl. Vol. 1968).
"rThe pertinent section of the statute gives the state welfare department the power to
• . . approve the placing of a child of this state in a family home of persons
unrelated to the child by a person not a resident of this state . . . by an
agency or organization with no place of business in this state. Written
approval of the proposed placement shall be obtained from the State
department. Such person, agency or organization shall furnish the state
department with such information as it may deem necessary regarding the
child and the prospective foster parents and such guaranty as is required by
the state department to protect the interests of the county in which the child
is to be placed.
NOTES
determined that non-resident indigents were entitled to neither. In
Higgins, Michigan could deny relief to non-resident children and
consequently their freedom of travel, but a local child did not encounter
these restraints. Just as Edwards struck down the exclusion statute,
Higgins ignored Michigan's attempt at discriminatory fiscal clearing.
In In re Paul and Mark,41 Judge Polier made use of the Higgins
analogy to the Edwards case as a foundation for considering the
constitutionality of California's attempt at fiscal clearing. The decision
involved a mother who, realizing she could not support her three children,
placed them in a New York welfare agency. Subsequently, she moved to
California, rehabilitated herself, established a home and requested that
her children be reunited with her. Despite the recommendations of a
California welfare agency and the New York agency, New York was
advised by California that the children could not be reunited with their
mother pending fiscal clearing with California. California wanted New
York to retain legal liability for the children since the mother could not
earn enough to support the children without state assistance.4 2 The New
York court found no justification for keeping the children from their
mother in light of the Edwards analogy43 and Shapiro's rejection of both
direct (exclusion statutes) and indirect (residency laws) attempts by state
agencies to discourage the right of freedom to travel.
The residency requirements invalidated in Shapiro are similar to the
California and Michigan fiscal clearing demands44 in that they imposed a
condition upon indigents in need of welfare who wished to enter the state.
Shapiro, in striking down the residency requirement as a threat to the
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws, cited Sherbert v.
Verner 4 5 which stated that this constitutional challenge cannot be
answered by the argument that public assistance benefits are a
"privilege" and not a "right.''" Fiscal clearing appears to be
unconstitutional in that public assistance is a child's right and if he is
eligible in one state, it would seem that he should be eligible in any state in
which he resides.4 7 Such a result is implied by the reasoning of Judge
Polier in In re Paul and Mark.
164 Misc. 2d 466, 315 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Family Ct. 1970).
'1t is not obvious from the facts as given in the case whether California was basing her
demand for guaranty on a statute or on informal welfare policy. However, California has
enacted the Uniform Transfer of Dependents Act. CAL. WELF. & INST'N S CODE § 18400
(West 1966). This Act allows a state to avoid financial responsibility through reciprocal
agreements.
4'See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 37-40 supra.
"Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
4Id.
47See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1872). This is not to suggest
that a child should be able to reap the benefits of double welfare payments. See text
accompanying notes 50-51 infra.
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A child's well-being is, however, within the state's constitutional
power to regulate. 8 This power is limited to regulations that promote the
welfare of the child and his physical, mental, and moral development." All
other considerations should be deferred or subordinated to the child's
interests.50 In light of this limitation it seems that where the indigent
child's welfare would be promoted by transporting him to another state,
the receiving state should not require fiscal clearing that would disregard
the child's well-being. Shapiro has affirmed another restriction upon the
state's right to regulate child welfare where the state has enacted
legislation that classifies the children. Where a classification serves to
penalize the exercise of a constitutional right, unless shown to be necessary
to promote a compelling governmental interest, the legislation is
unconstitutional. 5' Just as residency laws could not qualify under a
compelling governmental interest in Shapiro, fiscal clearing would appear
to fail in like manner.
States attempt to justify fiscal clearing procedures, contending that
they are based on permissible state objectives despite the fact that they
penalize the exercise of the constitutional freedom to travel. The state
objectives have yet to be specifically delineated but fiscal clearing would
be sanctioned as allowing for budget predictability, preventing double
payment to children, and saving state welfare costs.52 These objectives
failed to justify residency laws and by analogy they also seem to fall short
of validating fiscal clearing. Double payment (the possibility of two states
paying the same recipient child) might be prevented by requiring that the
migrant child give legal proof of his prior residency before assistance is
given by the receiving state. Notice to the last state of custody would
"See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968). The case involved a statute
prohibiting the sale of obscene literature to minors and this was held to be a constitutional
exercise of state police power, notwithstanding the fact that the Court indicated that had
minors not been involved in the sale, the literature may have been subjected to a different
test.
4See, e.g., Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961);
Weatherton v. Taylor, 124 Ark. 579, 187 S.W. 450 (1916); Williams v. Williams, 110 Colo.
473, 135 P.2d 1016 (1943); Workman v. Workman, 191 Ky. 124, 229 S.W. 379 (1921).
wId.
51394 U.S. at 634. To qualify as a compelling state interest the action must bear a
reasonable relationship to the achievement of the governmental purpose asserted as its
justification. The state must have so cogent an interest in the action as to justify the
infringements upon personal liberty. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
524-25 (1960). Restrictions of liberties must be justified by clear public interest, "threatened
not doubtfully or remotely, but by a clear and present danger." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530 (1944).
5'hese arguments were used to sanction residency requirements in Shapiro and would
appear to be the likely arguments of those states employing fiscal clearing practices.
NOTES
eliminate the possibility of double benefits. 53 The suggestion that the
receiving state's budget would remain predictable through the use of fiscal
clearing is cancelled by Shapiro which held that new residents are fot
required to give advance notice of their need for welfare assistance, The
contention that fiscal clearing will save state welfare costs by forcing the
sending state to retain the support obligation is defeated by the equal
protection clause. According to Rinaldi v. Yeager,5 the equal protection
clause imposes requirements of rationality and non-discriminatory
application upon state law. In other words, a state cannot impose special
burdens, in this instance restricted freedom of travel, upon defined classes
without the distinctions that are drawn having some relevance to the
purpose for which the classification is made.5 Fiscal clearing seems to be
discriminatory in its application as incoming indigent children are met
with clearing requirements that can deny the child state welfare where
resident indigent children do not encounter such treatment. In light of the
Supreme Court's holding in Rinaldi, it would seem that such a
classification would not be justified by an attempt to save money by
limiting welfare payments.
Moreover, the social philosophy recognized in this country for thirty-
five years since the adoption of the Social Security Act in 1935 57-that
every person in the country should have access to basic income to meet the
essential needs of life-is in conflict with restrictions on indigent aid., It is
not wrong for a person to move to another state because there are superior
educational, medical, or other social welfare provisions there. 9 According
to the Social Security Act, a state shall
provide . . . that all individuals wishing to make application for
aid to families with dependent children shall have the opportunity
0394 U.S. at 637.
"Id. at 635.
55384 U.S. 305, 309-10 (1966). Rinaldi involved an attempt to reduce expenses by
requiring prisoners to reimburse the state out of their institutional earnings for the cost of
furnishing a trial transcript. This was held unconstitutional because it did not require similar
repayments from unsuccessful appellants given a suspended sentence, placed on probation,
or fined.
5 1d. Cf. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966). Baxstrom involved a statute
which invidiously discriminated against the mentally ill. The classification was invalidated
by the same test mentioned in text.
5Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 (1964).
58See Note, Residence Requirement for Public Relief: An Arbitrary Prerequisite, 2
COLUM. J. OF L. AND SOC. PROB. 133, 143 (1966), citing Simons, "Our Obsolescent
Residence Laws," Speech presented at Forty-ninth California State Conference on Health
and Welfare, in Berkeley, California, May 3, 1960. The Social Security Act is an enactment
of progressive social legislation intended to alleviate a citizen's economic insecurity. Rivard
v. Bijou Furniture Co., 67 R.I. 251, 25 A.2d 563 (1941).
1'1d. See also 394 U.S. at 630.
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to do so, and that aid to families with dependent children shall be
furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.60
Those states which wish to take advantage of federal funds" must
conform to these requirements of the Social Security Act."2 Fiscal
clearing, by avoiding financial responsibilities for incoming indigent
children, appears to permit states to ignore the mandate of section 402
which provides for payments of federal money by the state to all eligible
individuals." States have the power to determine in a non-arbitrary
manner who is entitled to public assistance, but fiscal clearing as applied
by states such as California and Michigan in the aforementioned New
York cases is inconsistent with the philosophy that all should have access
to a basic income to meet the essential needs of life.
The concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in Edwards v. California
presents another possible approach by which fiscal clearing might be
challenged. Douglas concluded:
The right to move freely from State to State is an incident of
national citizenship protected by the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against state interference. 4
Although Douglas admitted there was no specific constitutional guarantee
of freedom to travel, he concluded that even before the fourteenth
amendment it was a fundamental right.' 5 Fiscal clearing results in this
same type of restraint upon a child exercising his rights of national
citizenship. When an indigent child, desiring to enter another state, is
subjected to fiscal clearing practices by the receiving state which seeks to
protect itself from any new financial burden, such a child is relegated to an
inferior class of citizenship. In light of the reasoning of Justice Douglas,
such a relegation is unconstitutional under the privileges and immunities
clause and infringes upon the child's fundamental rights.
-42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(9) (1964). The term "dependent child" means a needy child who
has lost his parents by reason of death, continued absence, or physical or mental incapacity.
42 U.S.C. § 606(a)(1) (Supp. 1964). The term is modified to permit a child to be treated as
a dependent when placed in a foster home or child care agency. 42 U.S.C. § 608 (1964).
"The funds come from the Federal plan for aid to families with dependent children which
provides funds to the states for distribution to parents of needy children. The state plan for
assistance is submitted to the Federal government and upon approval the state becomes
eligible for federal funding. For a full discussion of this plan see King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
(1968).
2Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450, 454 (1968). 42 U.S.C. 602(b) (1964)
authorizes the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to approve state plans which
impose a year's residence requirement on any child residing within the state. In light of
Shapiro, this is unconstitutional.
'Though paid to an adult guardian, the financial assistance is treated as a benefit to the
child. See Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450 at note 9.
"314 U.S. at 178.
"Id.
NOTES
Although fiscal clearing may restrict a child's right to travel, some
form of administrative procedure may be necessary to prevent payment by
more than one state." As implied by the language in Shapiro,67 such a
procedure might consist of exchanging data which would notify the
custodial state that the child had been entered on another state's welfare
rolls. Requiring proof of previous residence from the indigent child would
make him eligible for local assistance and would allow the receiving state
to notify the prior custodial state. In view of Shapiro, the imposition of
any further burden upon the incoming indigent child would seem to
discourage the child's constitutional right of freedom to travel. Since
fiscal clearing would impose additional burdens, it follows that these may
restrict an indigent child's right to travel and hence be unconstitutional.
E. THOMAS COX
"See text accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
"7See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 639 (1969).
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